I don’t support a policy of torture, but I don’t support the McCain Amendment either. Wars are complicated things in which numerous judgment calls must be made at every level of command. The executive rightfully has a great deal of inherent authority to conduct operations. I do not favor the McCain Amendments for the same reason that I would not favor Congressional legislation mandating that our military uses Napoleonic tactics, conducts an invasion on a particular day, or should conduct torture under judicial oversight (as Alan Dershowitz has argued).
Torture degrades the torturer as well as the victim. It creates a race of monsters living in one’s society and tends to erode the esprit de corps of the military in a liberal democracy. The case for torture is most often made in the instance of the “ticking time bomb,” the individual who, if tortured, can reveal information that will save millions of lives. But the problem of ticking time bombs is that they do not reveal themselves as such. One never knows if a particular detainee is a ticking time bomb. Torture becomes addictive to an organization that resorts to it on the principle that no stone should be left unturned.
Torture should not be permitted in military manuals or otherwise. It is not permitted today in military intelligence manuals, for instance. There is no lacuna in military or CIA doctrine requiring a complicated torture manual, complete with Alan Dershowitz’s seal of approval. But, there should not be a law specifically regulating the military and CIA’s interrogation techniques. The McCain Amendment goes beyond torture. It could proscribe and open to judicial review basic psychological pressure techniques that are time tested, cause no permanent harm, and work effectively. Some sleep deprivation, threats, psychological pressure, and techniques of disorientation are appropriate in the war on terror. Not only do they work, but they are more easily controlled and not particularly cruel. I would not want to see judicial or congressional meddling in these areas, and that’s what the McCain law would create. Further, it would open up the door to more vexatious interventions by other branches of government in the preeminent executive task, waging war.
But what of torture? Is it never necessary? Perhaps it is, but the law should not say so, as it represents an across-the-board community judgment, that is, a generally applicable rule. Such an awful decision should be made by the military interrogator or operative on the ground, aware of the potential legal consequences, and steeped in the military’s traditions of respect for the law of war. That is, as a true last resort. This is why an executive pardon power exists. Certain acts should not be socially condoned and should most often be punished. But under the right circumstances, they can also be forgiven. Far from requiring prior legal approval, such acts can be deemed necessary only when undertaken against the letter of the law. Any other approach would make their use too frequent and too degrading, both to the participants but to the broader society–a society whose moral authority would be undermined by any formal permission for torture. That said, particularly in war time, a broad use of the pardon power prevents the law and its mechanical operation from inflicting too much injustice on those making these touch decisions. At the opposite extreme from a torture code, such prosecutions would undermine respect for the law for the opposite reason, an absence of mercy
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“Such an awful decision should be made by the military interrogator or operative on the ground, aware of the potential legal consequences, and steeped in the military’s traditions of respect for the law of war. That is, as a true last resort. This is why an executive pardon power exists. Certain acts should not be socially condoned and should most often be punished. But under the right circumstances, they can also be forgiven.”"
Agreed which is why it should be illegal but pardonable.
(Hogan, J, dissenting from Roach, J):
The Blog Court has clearly carved out a new prerogative of the Executive branch by wholly ignoring the Constitution’s locating of such powers and duties in the legislature (citations not omitted:)
Art I Sec 8:
The Congress shall have Power To . . . .
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States
. . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
. . . To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court
. . . To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations
. . . To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water
. . . To raise and support Armies
. . . To provide and maintain a Navy
. . . To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces
. . . To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions
. . . To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline rescribed by Congress
. . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof
Not to mention the treaty obligations.
I don’t think this is a matter of delegated powers–which Congress arguably has–as it is of constitutional structure and respect for the President’s power to “take care” that the laws are faithfully executed and also to be commander in chief of the armed forces.
The real question is what does “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water” mean. I think it deals with when we can capture ships under the Marque and Reprisal powers, but I’m not sure.
Any experts out there?
It appears capture may refer only to property in this context. See Bouvier, far down below.
But first it is stil part of a coherent system of deciding the laws of war and governance of military rules which inlcude
“define and punish . . . Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”
“…make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”
“training the Militia according to the discipline rescribed by Congress”
The more dominant question is if we are bound by a treaty, it’s supreme law of land under the constitution and Congress has to carry it out (especially given the whole coherent scheme of Congressional governance of the military and state of war as defined in the powers above):
“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.” which inlcudes the treaty obligations.
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capture – Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Revised 6th Ed (1856) :
CAPTURE, war. The taking of property by one belligerent from another.
2. To make a good capture of a ship, it must be subdued and taken by an
enemy in open war, or by way of reprisals, or by a pirate, and with intent
to deprive the owner of it.
3. Capture may be with intent to possess both ship and cargo, or only
to seize the goods of the enemy, or contraband goods which are on board: The
former is the capture of the ship in the proper sense of the word; the
latter is only an arrest and detention, without any design to deprive the
owner of it. Capture is deemed lawful, when made by a declared enemy,
lawfully commissioned and according to the laws of war; and unlawful, when
it is against the rules established by the law of nations. Marsh. Ins. B. 1,
c. 12, s. 4.See, generally, Lee on Captures, passim; 1 Chitty’s Com. Law,
377 to 512; 2 Woddes. 435 to 457; 2 Caines’ C. Err 158; 7 Johns. R. 449; 3
Caines’ R. 155; 11 Johns. R. 241; 13 Johns. R.161; 14 Johns. R. 227; 3
Wheat. 183; 4 Cranch, 436 Mass. 197; Bouv. Inst. Index, h.t.