There is something almost comic in the calls by Kofi Annan to set up an international peacekeeping force to separate the combatants Southern Lebanon. While his desire to see peace and end the suffering of the Lebanese and Israeli people is natural, there is no reason to think such a force would be effective, and any intelligent person can see why.
For starters, such a force would lend legitimacy to Hezbollah, whose only token claim to legitimacy, if any, completely evaporated when Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000. Ostensibly a “national liberation” organization committed to freeing Southern Lebanon from Israeli control, Hezbollah’s raison d’etre disappeared and yet it continued to conduct terrorist operations and rocket attacks against Israel. To what end? Destruction for its own sake, dressed up with faux claims of “solidarity” with the Palestinians. The world should give no respect to this organization and should applaud its destruction by Israel. Legitimizing such organizations increases violence, while isolating and destroying them contributes to peace and stability.
That said, Hezbollah is not Lebanon. Everyone, including the Israelis, knows that Lebanon’s ineffective government and military cannot control Hezbollah. And the withdrawal of Syria’s forces from Lebanon, accelerated by Washington’s cajoling, only lessened that country’s ability to control Hezbollah as well. Hezbollah is able to act on its own, and, therefore, its members and military targets should be the chief recipient of any Israeli military action. Any concept of operations that seeks “collective punishment” of the Lebanese and their regime would be gratuitous and cruel and would likely also be military ineffective. It would be ineffective, because it would tend to unite the Lebanese, who could otherwise be convinced to isolate Hezbollah. While many civilians have died in Israel’s operations, it is hard to tell from this vantage point whether those are unavoidable casualties, a result of a certain negligence, or the product of what I believe would be an unjustified campaign of collective punishment. The jury remains out on that one. Under these circumstances, America is well advised to communicate these two points–placing primary blame on Hezbollah, coupled with some word of regard for innocent Lebanese civilians–and then simply do nothing, letting matters run their course. This seems to be the administration tack so far, which is surprisingly practical from a group that had previously been so gung-ho and interventionist.
Paleoconservative critics, including Daniel Larison, have suggested this response is out of kilter with the US response to other humanitarian catastrophes, such as the US criticism and ultimate attack upon the Serbs for their role in causing the mass flight of Albanians from Kosovo during Serbian counter-terrorist operations. But, wasn’t it we, the paleoconservatives, who said then that Serbia had every right to defend its borders and its people from militant Islamic terrorists? Shouldn’t we now, as paleconservatives, recognize the same right of self-defense in the nation of Israel? Perhaps this is inconsistent with actual US policy, but it is not inconsistent with paleoconservative ideas, strictly speaking.
Of course, I agree strongly with the paleoconservative criticism of the long-term US support and aid for Israel or any other nation. Such “entangling alliances” are detrimental to both nations’ interests. This is particularly so when other nations have legitimate grievances with our clients; it simply embroils us in conflicts that we could otherwise steer clear of, and it puts us in the dubious position of being associated with policies and actions that we do not choose and cannot fully control. I would no more want to side with Israel in a border war with Lebanon than I would have wanted the US to intervene in the Falklands to help Britain fight Argentina. And the fact that Israel’s enemies are terrorists, no more obliges us to take sides than we are obliged to take sides in Peru’s campaign against Marxist terrorists or in the parochial conflict between Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers. Most of these are none of our business because they do not affect us so long as we remain aloof. We can be neutral in these conflicts, even if we simultaneously acknowledge that those who resort to terrorist tactics deserve no quarter or support. In other words, the principle of neutrality needs to be restored in the American lexicon, as well as the lexicon of international diplomacy and international law.
Any international peacekeeping force likely would fail to acknowledge the illegitimacy of Hezbollah and the need for its destruction. It would simply get between the two sides, under the implicit assumption that the two sides could negotiate a peace treaty more effectively when they have cooled down and do not have the immediate burden of combat. But without allowing some kind of change in the balance of power to occur, a cease-fire would simply prolong the agony of the Israeli and Lebanese people. The UN force would provide an umbrella under which Hezbollah could rearm and regroup, something it’s unable to do now under the active Israeli assault. Israel would remain threatened and fearful of continued terrorist assaults. The worst case scenario would be for the peacekeepers to be in the middle of two sides with an active dispute, the fundamentals of which have not changed, because combat was short-circuited by a premature cease-fire. Stable armistices come to pass when one side is weary of fighting, and the winning side can get a reasonable return on its investment in force. Without that, a cease-fire is just that, a temporary halt in fighting that will inevitably return.
The only thing dumber than a cease-fire policed by UN forces would be a cease-fire policed by UN forces that included American troops. America has been in this position before, in the same country, with the same kind of mission. This led to a predictable debacle, that ultimately ended in a humiliating American withdrawal.
In this case, as in many others, the best thing for outsiders to do is wait for events and the balance of power to change before putting on pressure for the combatants to end to the conflict. An apparent parity of forces is precisely the reason this conflict began. Only the resolution of this miltiary conflict militarily can change the calculus for both sides. The chief cause of any military conflict is that one side thinks it can accomplish something by force, and the other side does not agree. If we do not allow that “something” to come to pass, the same conditions that are producing conflict now will produce the same result down the road.
The Wilsonian notion that America, the UN, or any other group of outsiders should “do something” is the chief reason petty border squabbles can metastasize into “World War II,I” when they might otherwise be contained. In the name of creating world unity against aggression, the interventionists instead create a formula for perpetual and ever larger wars fought by enormous coalitions of people with no direct stake in the conflict. This is madness. Yet this is the fundamental premise of the United Nations and the “New World Order.”
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My only quibble here is with the analogies to Sri Lanka and the Falklands, Chris. You set up the strawman argument that we should ally with Israel because she, like us, is engaged in a war with terrorists, and then you refute that argument with the analogies. But I’m sure you agree that the real war here is not against “terrorism” but against, at the very least, a militant form of Islam (and more likely, if we are being honest with ourselves, against plain old Islam). When viewed in that light, allying with the Israelis against the “Party of God” in an effort to destroy it certainly makes a lot more sense than allying with Sri Lanka against the Tamil Tigers. And the case is further strengthened when we recognize that Hizbollah has been at war with us for over 20 years and was, before 9/11, responsible for more US deaths than any other state or group in our lifetimes.
Now, I don’t think this makes a compelling case for a US-Israeli alliance against Hizbollah, given that I don’t think we can do anything to them that the Israelis can’t do, and given the political costs you mention. Frankly, we would probably just hold the Israelis back. But I do believe it is a closer call than you describe. And I also believe that our de facto alliance whereby we sell key weapons to the Israelis and defend them on the world stage does make a lot of sense in this context.
I guess it all depends if we view Hezbollah as chiefly a worlwide Islamic terrorist group with worldwide aims, or a local group, that uses pan-Islamic rhetoric, but basically has parochial local goals of getting the Israelis out of Lebanon and generally making life hard for the Israelis. Their attacks on the US forces, I understand, were chiefly aimed at us insofar as we were involved in Lebanon, hindering their efforts to assert control in a multiparty civil war. When we left, their attacks stopped.
It seems to me that there is something to be said to distinguish al Qaeda, which is truly worldwide in its aims, and these local groups that have generally acted locally, against their competitors and the Israelis. These local groups have certain things in common with al Qaeda no doubt, not least their general hostility and alienation from the West, but I think that nationalism is the glue that holds them together and also the fuel that keeps them going. So long as they see their national and pan-Arab goals hindered by Israel, they will focus their attention upon it and not upon us. To the extent we deliberately distance ourselves from this conflict, I think the hard-core anti-Americanism that animates some of these groups will dissipate and not translate into anti-American violence. I believe this was the general tenor of Arab nationalist groups prior to the 1980s.
The Israeli tension with these groups, then, is at least partly related to its orientation and location. It’s much like our beef with the Sunni-led Iraqi resistance. If we were not there, I think they would not bother us and could be contained. They certainly would not be “worldwide” terrorist groups that should concern us. Bush made a useful distinction in one of its earliest speeches that we shall focus the “war on terror” upon terrorist groups with “global reach.” I believe when we leave Iraq, for example, all but the smallish al Qaeda inspired insurgents will continue to threaten us. The rest will focus on local goals, chiefly harming the Iraqi regime. Israel does not have this luxury of disassociating itself from these local terrorist groups, and its existence will remain plagued by Arab nationalists, secular and otherwise. In other words, it has set itself up for perpetual conflict. We do not have to endure this burden and can focus our attentions on the truly global threat of al Qaeda while providing. I agree that our counter-terrorist goals require some solidarity with other nations beset by terrorists. But I believe that some of these conflicts are complicated in their origins and their logic. Groups that behave terroristically are not justified in that terrorism, but that does not mean all of their grievances are nonexistent or that there is no injustice that animates them. In this case and also the case of Hamas, I believe, at most, America should give moral support to the Israelis in their conflict with its local Islamic terrorists. To the extent we provide aid in materiel, diplomatic capital, and money, I think we hurt ourselves and only help the Israelis to a very limited extent. They will have to negotiate their own solution to this structural dilemma. They cannot pursue a purely military solution because they depend, as a small nation, on international trade. I’d prefer to see them respond in a way that does not overly burden innocents who have the misfortune of simply being Arab and living in neighboring states. But, as I said above, certain military realities (and perceived realities) must change for that to truly happen. It’s really a mess, and it’s too messy and too unlikely to be resolved any time soon for us to burden ourselves with this conflict. With a policy of strategic disengagement, we could otherwise isolate these conflicts rhetorically and practically from the broader problem of anti-western Islamic extremism. Far from playing into al Qaeda hands where they describe every bit of collateral damage inflicted by Israel as justification for their actions, we could persuasively describe these actions as totally unrelated to the US and its actions because, without the high degree of support we currently supply to Israel, they would be.
Communist rebels in Vietnam for example also clothed their aims in global terms, ostensibly fighting for the worldwide proletarian communist revolution. But once we left they ignored us and left us alone; it turned out they were plain old nationalists. I think that Hezbollah is basically a local type group, that its attacks on Israel will remain largely limited to Israel, that Israel’s actions will give those attacks greater and lesser degrees of justification in the eyes of the world, and the Arab world in particular, and that we should try as much as possible to disassociate ourselves from what I perceive as primarily a nationalist civil war between Arabs and Jews for control of Israel proper.
All civil wars have elements of justice and injustice on both sides. I think terrorism is unacceptable and that Hezbollah is a group of terrorists. I also think they in particular have no legitimate aims at this point, simply harassing Israel for the sake of harassing Israel. But once Israel respond to them, as they have, other Lebanese will predictably be inspired to unite against Israel and oppose its intervention. I think Israel can and should destroy Hezbollah, in spite of this problem. But I thought the same of Serbia and its Kosovar Albanians. I don’t like terrorist tactics, even when they’re attatched to certain legitimate goals. But local conflicts should not involve us whether they’re in Serbia or Lebanon or Israel. If I were Lebanese I’d look at this one way, and if I were Israeli I’d look at it completely differently. It’s hard for any outsider to adopt a perspecdtive of “global justice” to these conflicts because, as in most wars, what is right and justified depends a lot on one’s location and one’s nation.
I guess, what I’m saying, is I think Hezbollah is more local in its orientation than you see it, in spite of its breach of Israel’s Lebanese border and in spite of its earlier, pre 9/11 attacks on American forces in Lebanon. And, because of this, I think we should not get too involved.
We may not disagree on how much we should ultimately “get involved.” As I said, I don’t think our direct involvement in the conflict would be particularly useful, but I’m quite happy to sell the Israelis certain weapons that are useful in their war. I’m not sure where you stand on that.
But more importantly, I think you’re missing the bigger picture here on Hezbollah’s “global aims.” First, let’s not forget that even if it were focused only on the situation in Israel in Lebanon, its reach extends much further. Witness the synagogue, embassy, and community center bombings in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994. Second, there is clear evidence that Hezbollah considers the US an enemy aside and apart from its Lebanese intervention, which ended in 1983 shortly after it began. Witness Lebanese Hezbollah’s connections with the Khobar Towers bombings in Saudi Arabia in 1996 (which were perpetrated by a local Hezbollah group under the Iranian umbrella that supports Lebanese Hezbollah), as well as the numerous Hezbollah cells that have been identified in Europe (none of whose countries opposes Hezbollah’s political objectives in Lebanon) and the United States (which has been out of Lebanon for over 20 years).
Finally, you ignore the critical Iranian connection. Iran supplies, funds, and to a significant extent directs Hezbollah through Syria, and this most recent attack on Israel took place coincidentally at the same time as international concerns over Iran’s budding nuclear program reached a fever pitch. It’s impossible to “prove” the motives behind Hezbollah’s gambit and the extent of Iranian influence, but most knowledgeable analysts draw a significant connection, and the particulars of Iranian rhetoric these last two weeks have only reinforced that connection in the minds of most.
You yourself say that Hezbollah has not had a legitimate goal (presumably since 1999 at the latest) given that Israel was out of Lebanon until these last few days. But then separately you talk about Hezbollah’s interests and objectives being local rather than more global. But if Hezbollah continues to act as it has always acted even after achieving victory in its so-called “war of national liberation” in southern Lebanon, then what does that tell us about Hezbollah’s true interests and objectives, especially when we think about the Buenos Aires and Khobar attacks as well as the Iranian connection?
I don’t believe that any of this requires us to approach Hezbollah as we approach al Qaeda. But it does indicate that (1) those who argue that we should have a much better and more nuanced argument than you seem to give them credit for, and (2) Hezbollah is certainly one of the critical pillars on the other side in our war against Islam (or radical Islam).
Let me add one more thing. Chris, you are hawkish on the Iranian nuclear issue, more so than I am, yet much more dovish on Hezbollah (and on any state or organization in direct conflict with Israel). If ever there were a clearer case of a country with dangerous regional but few if any global ambitions, it’s Iran. Moreover, as an actual country, Iran is certainly relatively more “containable” than a terrorist non-state actor like Hezbollah. In both the Iranian and Hezbollah cases there are severe political risks to dealing with the potential threat in an aggressive manner, and in the Iranian case there are severe material risks as well. And yet you’re all guns-a-blazing, at least in your temperament, vis-a-vis Iran, while adopting the measured posture of a disinterested observer (at least realtively so) vis-a-vis Hezbollah. You seem more willing to trust the angry sheiks of the Party of God to leave the US alone, but not to trust the Khameini government of Iran not to attack us if deterred sufficiently. Why?
And perhaps even more to the point, why on earth would we look upon the Iranian nukes program as an unacceptable danger, but look upon a Lebanese terrorist group that is partially-controlled by Iran, has attacked numerous American targets for over two decades, and has global reach, as a local movement unworthy of our attention?
I should be clear about what all this means to me. At the end of the day, I think we’re basically handling this the right way. As Americans, we should (1) recognize that Hezbollah and Iran are cut from the same cloth, on the same side, and our enemies; and (2) root for the Israelis — clearly our allies in this rebric — as they fight Hezbollah. We should help them in individual instances to the extent practically justified by a cost-benefit analysis.
My sense is that Chris views Iran as our enemy, Hezbollah as Israel’s enemy, and the two issues as fairly separate. Again, I can see no logical basis for this distinction save a dislike of Israel.
Wade says:
“Again, I can see no logical basis for this distinction save a dislike of Israel.”
Surely that’s hyperbolic. Regardless even of local intent, it remains the case that a nuclear weapon confers a significantly larger capacity to harm the United States. Conversely, even if Hezbollah has the intent to harm the U.S., it evidently hasn’t shown much capacity to do so. Absent an enemy with the appropriate combination of intent plus capacity to harm us, there isn’t any good reason for us to get involved in the conflict. Perhaps if Hezbollah began deploying its resources in al-Qaeda-like manner, then it would be, but right now, it doesn’t seem to be doing so.
Even if Hezbollah happens to be furthering Iran’s aims in that region, it might not be furthering either Hezbollah’s intent or capacity to harm us. In that case, Iran’s involvement is still irrelevant, because we are concerned about Iran as a threat to us, not Iran in general. If Iran were funding Hezbollah to “go global” like al-Qaeda, then we’d have an interest.
Like Chris said, if we though Israel couldn’t handle this, it might be a different story. But to some extent, we have to expect that Israel is going to be in conflict with its neighbors on a more or less regular basis in the foreseeable future. Unless such conflicts have implications for our own security in the manner described, we should neither need nor want to get involved in them.
I think after I have laid out my position so throughly that it’s kind of uncool to simply pin down my thoughts on Iran and Hezbollah as explicable by the allegation I don’t like Israel.
I explicitly applaud the destruction of Hezbollah above, I just don’t think it’s a major threat to us, and I don’t think that destroying Hezbollah is the only thing Israel is up to, as evidenced by its bombing of Christian areas of Beiruit for example. I think Hezbollah has been used by Iran for a limited purpose, primarily to strike at and harass Israel. It is dangerous because it is an arm of Iran; cut off Iran, and it’s one more piss-ant local militia. So, I do think there’s a difference.
It’s like saying the Viet Cong or the Sandanitas were a major international threat. No they were not; they were only because they were both arms of the Soviet Union. We were better advised to focus our efforts on weakening the patron rather than playing “wack a mole” with its proxies.
You raise some good points about Khobar Towers, Buenos Aires, etc. I don’t know much about those other attacks and am open to being persuaded. I also am ambivalent about Iran. I flirt with the concept of bombing its nuclear facilities, but you’ll notice I’ve not written much on it. I simply don’t know enough of what we should do to deal with Iran. I do think Ralph Peters and other have made a good point that Hezbollah has its own agenda that is not fully controlled by Iran and that this episode may have simply been an attempt not to get “one upped” by Hamas when the latter kidnapped an Israeli soldier. Iran, it has been suggested, was caught up in this in spite of itself. It’s simply impossible to tell.
I have no love for Iran. And I have no love for Hezbollah; I simply judge, as a factual matter, that one is more important and more of a threat to us. I also don’t view them as simply being essentially the same, equally responsible and benefitting from the actions of the other.
Equating the Communist and Islamic radical threats doesn’t work. The Communist plan was to conquer countries like Vietnam, make them Communist, and then move on to the next country. In contrast, the Islamic terrorists hope to wantonly kill as many inhabitants of the non-Communist countries as possible at first opportunity. That makes it difficult to say that any of them should just be left alone to work out their local issues.
To say that the only global Islamic threat is Al Qaeda is to ignore the fact that most of the terrorist attacks committed since 9/11 were conducted by groups with only very loose operational ties to Al Qaeda. Their real tie to Al Qaeda was in their ideology.
There may be local issues currently occupying terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, but to claim they aren’t similarily motivated to kill all infidels at first opportunity is mistaken. As far as I am concerned, that is what the issue with Israel is all about. If Hezbollah was truly interested in local issues rather than ideology, why would their first concern be wiping out Israel rather than getting a piece of Lebanon’s booming tourism industry.
Let’s face it, much of the Islamic world is infected with a new “universal” ideology, one that necessarily involves killing us. Whatever other nuances exist, overlooking this fact isn’t a good idea.
I agree wholeheartedly with Dave.
In response to Jonathan, I agree with his distinction about the far greater capacity for a nuclear weapon to harm us. But does anyone really believe there is a serious threat of the Iranian regime nuking us? Certainly that is much less likely than Hezbollah blowing up a lot of stuff here in the continental US. In fact, the biggest fear with regard to the Iranian nuke is that it will get into the hands of a terrorist organization — one like Hezbollah. My only point is that given the strong ties between Iran and Hezbollah (and despite Chris’ argument about it having its own, independent goals, I doubt anyone can seriously contend that Hezbollah is anything other than an Iranian client), we would do well to consider Hezbollah an enemy and a potential threat, rather than a local terrorist group of little to no concern to us, like the Tamil Tigers or the Argentines who attacked the Falklands. Remember that this is where this discussion began — with my objection to such analogies as categorization errors with potentially harmful policy effects.
So, if we can agree that Hezbollah is an enemy and a potential threat, the issue becomes that which Chris raises — does it make sense to play whack-a-mole with an Iranian client focused on Israel for the moment? Well, maybe not, which is why I propose rhetorical support and weapons sales for the Israelis, rather than the pseudo-neutral policy that Chris seems to advocate. Of course, Chris ignores the critical fact that there are several Hezbollah cells in the United States. Do you guys think they’re over here because they like baseball or something? If we take the potential threat of those cells seriously, doesn’t it make sense to support the destruction of the umbrella organization that governs them by the one army willing and capable of destroying it? Again, I’m talking about weapons and rhetoric, not a direct intervention.
My point about the illogic of Chris’ position rests on the clear inconsistencies with his approach to most every other foreign policy issue of our lifetimes that does not involve Israel. We gave a lot more than weapons and rhetorical support to a bunch of crappy regimes these last several decades, including Mobutu in Zaire, Savimbi in Angola, the South Vietnamese, Rhee in South Korea . . . the list goes on and on. As far as I know, Chris supported all these policies for reasons similar to the ones I advocate an open support of Israel today. Again, what’s the distinction?
Even more to the point, if I am not mistaken Chris, you are generally-supportive (or at least not a vociferous opponent) of our rhetorical support (and presumably weapons sales) to the current Jordanian and Egyptian governments, among other Arab crap-holes. We all know there is a political cost to such support — hatred of us on the “Arab street” and all the rest — and it is the same cost that Chris raises as prohibitive of any rhetorical support for Israel in this war. Again, why the distinction?
Finally, a specific point. Chris persists in pretending that the Israeli attacks on portions of Beirut and other Lebanese territory north of the Hezbollah enclaves are a disproportionate response indicating other motives at work besides the mere destruction of Hezbollah. What motives are those, exactly? The Israeli desire to turn Lebanon into an unstable bunghole on her northern border for no other reason than shits and giggles? In fact, each of these attacks has a logistical military rationale, because as Chris says, “whack-a-mole” isn’t a very effective strategy; Israel has to destroy the infrastructure and transportation networks by which Hezbollah is supplied and reinforced if it is to have any hope of destroying Hezbollah.
I should add that I did not pin Chris’ thoughts on the whole situation to a dislike of Israel. I accept that Chris doesn’t like Hezbollah and wants it destroyed. Chris and I agree on where we differ — whether the US should provide weapons, rhetoric, and other indirect support to the Israelis in an effort to aid them in doing the job. I say yes because of Hezbollah’s consistent attacks on us over the years, the presence of numerous Hezbollah terrorist cells in our country, and Hezbollah’s status as the most important client of one of our two biggest enemies in the world today. Chris says no, and based on his explanations, I believe his position to be inconsistent with his typical foreign policy views and largely the result of a dislike of Israel.
Maybe I’m just reading this exchange incorrectly, and please say if I am, but it seems that the real difference between Roach and Wade here is only that Wade supports U.S. aid to Israel while Roach does not. Neither advocates getting our troops involved in this matter. Wade sees our aid to Israel as a way to put a sort of proxy force in the area to beat on anti-American elements like Hezbollah and Hamas, while Roach sees that as a distraction from the real issue in the area, Iran, and that we should be focusing our resources directly on Iran rather than waste them on Israel’s troubles.
Between those two points of view, I side more with Wade. Our aid to Israel has created a stable situation in that no matter what the local Arab groups want, Israel is staying put. I also see a moral reason to provide aid to Israel, but reasonable minds can disagree on this so I won’t belabor that point. Finally, as much as Roach is correct that Israel is a distraction for us, it’s a far greater distraction to the anti-American elements in the Middle East. Even if Iran has a nuclear weapon, they won’t give a second’s worth of thought at slinging it our way. Israel would be the one and only conceivable target. Or remember how Syria pledged $1 billion for the rebuilding of Lebanon — that’s money not being spent on anti-American pursuits. Israel is the penultimate flypaper for militant Islamists. It’s strategically invaluable.
That’s the conclusion of the logical side of me. The moral/emotional side cheers on Israel because, whatever the sins inflicted on Islamists by the heavy-handed Zionists (and there have been many such sins), they pale in comparison to the utterly inhuman, dare I say EVIL responses blessed by the militant Islamists. If Yasser Arafat had gone the Ghandi route, he would have truly earned the Nobel Peace Prize and accomplished much more, including sovereignty, for his people. Instead he and the Islamists chose to engage in the most heinous forms of terrorism, duping their own people into becoming hate-filled suicide machines, while those at the top gobbled up the foreign aid for themselves. Such actions deserve to be punished through the use of extremely prejudicial force, and I welcome their come-uppance.
I think James summarizes the key areas of difference between Chris and me well.
I also wants to second James’ moral point in the final paragraph of his comment. I have been focusing on what I believe to be a realist approach to the Hezbollah problem because I think Chris and I share some of the same premises and therefore may be able to persuade each other as to specific interests and policy positions. Alas, we likely disagree on a deeper level when it comes to my instinctive moral support for the Israelis in their various wars against various Arab and Islamic states and non-state entities.
On the parallel with Kosovo, I want to add a clarification. NATO intervened in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia–Yugoslavia was not crossing an international border to fight its Islamic terrorists, threatening a regional crisis; the Serb counterinsurgency had not created a refugee crisis nor, as a rule, did it indiscriminately target the civilian population of Kosovo. My point is that the Serb fighting in Kosovo was much more limited and had far less fallout, but it somehow demanded a 78-day air war; Israel’s campaign is far more aggressive and devastating, yet it receives approval.
I don’t dispute Israel’s basic right to retaliate against attacks on its territory. As you do, I object to the excessive, misguided nature of that retaliation and the U.S.’s remarkable tolerance for things which, if done by a Yugoslavia or some other regime Washington opposed, would prompt American sanctions if not military action. I have been trying, perhaps unsuccessfully, to show the double standard being applied here and to question why one country’s internal security policy merited our extensive bombardment while another’s more aggressive pursuit of its security interests merits our praise and weapon shipments. Since Mr. Bush the candidate supported the bombing of Yugoslavia, I do not assume this is simply a difference of administrations.
“Wade sees our aid to Israel as a way to put a sort of proxy force in the area to beat on anti-American elements like Hezbollah and Hamas, while Roach sees that as a distraction from the real issue in the area, Iran, and that we should be focusing our resources directly on Iran rather than waste them on Israel’s troubles.”
I think the real problem is whether Hezbollah and Hamas actually qualify as “anti-American” in the sense of posing a real threat to us. IOW, beating on Hezbollah in Lebanon may be neither damaging Iran by proxy nor damaging the effectiveness of the Hezbollah sleeper cells in the U.S., which probably don’t depend on Hezbollah coordination anyway. And as far as Iran using sleeper cells as a delivery mechanism for nuclear devices, the real question would be whether beating up Hezbollah in Lebanon would actually help that (it doesn’t seem automatically true). As far as Israel’s defense goes, if they can handle it themselves, then we needn’t get involved. In fact, I worry a bit whether our involvement doesn’t actually rally other interest to Hezbollah’s cause. All of these are reasons consistent with Chris’s position not to engage in the conflict that have nothing to do with like or dislike of Israel.
But I agree that there is reasonable disagreement on the question of whether additional effort on our part to cripple Hezbollah would be justified by a reduced overall threat level to us. Wade has that part right. I just happen to think that he isn’t giving enough credence to Chris’s reasons in his analysis.
A few quick thoughts.
I fear I’ve been unclear, both here and in a parallel email exchange with Wade.
First, as I said initially, Hezbollah is very bad. Every nation everywhere should oppose it. Its goals, while perhaps not worldwide in scope, are utterly indefensible and nihilistic. It’s not as if it’s the champion of the Palestinian people; even a Hamas has at least an admixture of rationality built into its purpose in a way that the post-Israeli-withdrawal Hezbollah does not. So in the case of a conflict this kind of support–moral, public, and diplomatic–is worthwhile, because all nations everywhere dealing with international terrorist groups that are not even animated by addressing some injustice (as so many domestic terrorist groups are) deserve no quarter, no support, and no protection under international law.
Even Lebanon’s own sovereignty may rightfully be violated here, because it has failed to do its job as a nation by controlling the forces within its borders. While we should demand proportionality, particular insofar as innocent Lebanese are involved, it would be morally obtuse to demand this when the extent of Israeli tactics and any negligence is so unclear, rockets continue to rain on Israel, and Lebanon proper has not even attempted to reign in the “state within a state” operating around its southern frontiers.
But there is another kind of support, though, which I think is distinct which takes the form of our long-term financial and other support for Israel. I think this is excessive, entangling, and unwise. I think it’s particularly unwise in this instance because Irael–by its location, its demographics, its foreign origins, its recent origins, its treatment of the Palestinians, and the continuing insuilt it supplies to Arab pride–is going to be conflict-ridden for the forseeable future, with or without Islamic extremism. Why would we want to get into bed with such a regime? Isn’t this the kind of thing Washington warned us about?
I think our ad hoc and more arms length relationships with places like Jordan or Pakistan are far more appropriate and far more effective for the conflict we face. No one doubts our mutual independence; no one dares to say any of these nations control our foreign policy to our detriment (though this is reasonably said of the Saudis). Yet we work together for common goals and, more important, pressure these regimes into not allowing domestic elements harm us.
So, I think Israelââ¬âlike Thailand, Serbia, and Iraq todayââ¬âdeserves diplomatic and verbal support, but I donââ¬â¢t think today in 2006 (and certainly at any point since 1990) itââ¬â¢s wise to have the kind of extensive public alliance, involvement, meddling, and funding we have provided them. I believe it’s equally ridiculous that we provide this kind of funding to Egypt, in effect bribing the two sides not to kill each other. I believe in this policy of disengagement not out of animus, but for strong realist reasons.
The chief realist reason is that our relationship with Israel hurts our more important relationships with friendly Arab and Muslim leaders who are much less crazy than the alternatives and, more important, the only viable alternative to pro al Qaeda regimes taking root across the Middle East. Further, our relationship with Israel inflames our enemies, inflames Muslim public opinion ,creates problems with other western allies, costs money, is frequently unreciprocated (and reciprocated in some case by spying), and is not necessary to form our more necessary coalitions with the Arab regimes who are up close and personal with most of al Qaedas potential recruits and members. These Arab and Muslim regimes’ support and cooperation is many times more important for victory than our relationship with Israel, and if it means we have to distance ourselves from Israel to maintain that cooperation, we should do so.
It is notable that the most prominent of these regimes–Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia–are also concerned about Hezbollah and likely could provide the kind of counterweight to them that is actually plausible and marketable in the Arab world, so long as these regimes’ are dismissed, as they now often are, as being in bed with the best friend of their worst enemy, Israel. In other words, this is not an either/or from a realist perspective, but a question of what is optimal and how much do we lose compared to what we gain from our undeniably close ties to Israel (many times closer than ours with Egypt, in spite of similar levels of foreign aid).
It has been suggested I do not “like” Israel. This is not true. I have no negative feelings to Israelis or Israel and have, especially since the reign of terror brought to bear during the Second Intefadah, a great deal of sympathy.
Perhaps I was once more hostile, not least due to its pointless collective punishments of the Palestinians imposed by Israel and the rank hypocricy of Israel’s largely liberal, and otherwise dovish, Jewish supporters in America. But I now view Israel kind of the way I do Serbia or South Africa or the American pioneers: a nation of basically decent people who must endure all kinds of burdens and commit certain indecencies because of their very geography. I also view with a certain sympathy the tragedies of the Palestinians for what should be obvious reasons, but in part because so many of them have been caught up in conflicts that were foisted upon them simply by the accident of geography.
What I do not like, however, are long-term alliances and associations with any other regimes. We do not share the same burdens of history and geography as the Israelis and should not take them on sua sponte.
I think the Cold War was unique and required that kind of international effort made up largely of alliances; even then, we got in bed too fast and too often with too many dirtbags. These “friends” often did more to hurt our moral credibility that was not outweighed by their official support of the West. Think of the Doe regime in Liberia or the deep distrust of America in Latin America from our support for various brutal dictators. And, yes, many of these regimes were many times worse than Israel, but the issue then as here is what is the benefit, not the moral question of “who is worse than whom.”
But we were less harmed than we might. Everyone had to pick a side back then: us or the Soviets. We and our clients usually came out looking better. But now such stark choices are not required; our unvaoidable association with injustices by picking sides in complicated foreign conflicts, such as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, chiefly impose costs with little apparent benefit. Bystanders need not pick sides; they can simply induldge in the luxury of condemning bad or excessive acts by both sides and otherwise try to contain the conflict, not least by remaining explicitly neutral.
So, in an international conflict with international terrorists, we should support Israel, at least rhetorically and diplomatically. Even in this case, we should not endorse it completely and without qualification, because some of its tactics are likely ones we would not endorse and cannot control Finally, we should not be its ally or “friend” without qualification, because such a relationship, particularly with a nation in an unstable part of the world where we must also be friends with some of Israel’s enemies, is too costly and too restraining from the perspective of US interests.
Daniel, you’re right about the double standard. But the way to resolve it is to recognize the wrongheadedness of our war against Serbia, not to condemn legitimate Israeli actions. As far as the specific Israeli responses go, this proportionality nonsense has gone too far. In most all circumstances, a strict proportionality test applied to the state victim of international terrorism will prevent said state victim from being able to respond to terrorist attacks with any degree of success. The reason Israel has to bomb parts of the Lebanese infrastructure is because this infrastructure is used by Israel’s state enemies to supply and reinforce Hezbollah. It will be hard enough for Israel to hope to destroy or significantly weaken Hezbollah with the tack it has taken, so imagine how impotent a so-called “proportional” defensive response would be.
In my opinion, the paleoconservatives and many on the anti-Israel Left use this proportionality point as a rhetorical trick, and nothing more. It sounds all moderate and balanced to say, “Yes, we think you have the right to defend yourselves; you’ve simply gone too far in the particular manner you’ve chosen to do so.” But in actuality, this is a throwaway line that, if taken to heart in most any instance of international terrorism, would present the state victim in Israel’s position with one of two choices — enact some weak-seeming and useless defensive measures that in no way reduce the threat, or do nothing. It’s very hard to strike back at a lawless outlaw band such as Hezbollah. Israel has tried dealing with Hezbollah in numerous ways — ceasefire negotiations after the Grapes of Wrath operation in 1996 (didn’t work), withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 1999 (didn’t work), and “proportional” responses over the last 6 or 7 years (didn’t work). It seems reasonable for the Israelis to conclude in response to the latest provocation that their best bet is to try to destroy Hezbollah, and all the evidence I’ve seen of Israeli attacks in Lebanon — including the attacks in Beirut of which Chris and presumably Daniel speak — reflect that goal, not some sort of collective responsibility attack on the civilians of Lebanon. If you can point to deliberate Israeli killing of innocents qua innocents, with no military rationale, that’s one thing. Otherwise I believe this to be a fairly dishonest rhetorical device designed to cover up the ever-present double standard that the paleos apply to Israel as opposed to everyone else.
As for Jonathan, I see his point; I just think he’s wrong on how the factual analysis comes out. Hezbollah has killed a lot of Americans. The tight Iranian link is fairly obvious from the evidence available. And we’re at war with a resurgent Islam, of which Hezbollah is an important and powerful arm. We ignore it at our peril. Is this enough to convince the US to send in troops or planes? No. But it is certainly more than enough to prove the wisdom of strong rhetorical and other indirect support for Israel’s war.
We don’t have a formal alliance with Israel; we have a long-standing “friendly” relationship like the one we have with Jordan (I disagree with Chris’ characterization of the Jordanian and Pakistani relationships as ad hoc and arms-length). I agree that we should cut down drastically our financial assistance to Israel, just as we should do the same vis-a-vis Egypt, which I believe to be the second-highest recipient of American largesse. I also do not believe that we should automatically support the Israelis in any international conflict, as we likely would a formal ally. In short, I think the Reagan Administration’s Israel policy — strong support at the UN and against terrorist organizations and states, coupled with sharp rebukes where warranted (the 1981 attack on Iraq is an excellent, if forgotten, example of such) — was, in general, the wisest course.
But here’s my problem with what Chris seems to be saying — I can’t tell, beyond the issues discussed above, what exactly Chris wants to change about our Israel policies. Fewer weapons? Then does he support a concomitant reduction in weapons sales to regimes like Jordan and Morocco, as President Washington likely would have, but as would also increase the likelihood of Islamic revolutions in those countries? Less talk about friendship between the countries? Then I assume Chris believes we should do the same vis-a-vis India (a popular “friend” lately), Pakistan, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and any other country that could get embroiled in some political difficulties with other states?
What specific policies does Chris wish to change?
I have no problem approving of Israel’s legitimate actions retaliating against attacks and securing its country from further attacks. I might even be willing to grant the point about infrastructure, though the bombing of the international airport seems like a decided strike against the entire country and was not aimed primarily at Hizbullah interests, and attacks on power stations impose real burdens on the entire civilian population. But the massive displacement of civilians and the incidents of bombing vehicles taking refugees out of the war zone are excessive and wrong. There are probably some who may be using proportionality as a club with which to beat Israel and nothing more, but for my part I take it very seriously. We could argue about whether the response is proportionate, but that proportionality is a legitimate standard of justice in war is something I insist on. Without taking that standard into account, talk of whether Israel’s response is justified or not loses a lot of its meaning.
To respond to the kidnapping of two soldiers (and, yes, I understand that this is the latest incident in a string of incidents) with a wide-ranging air campaign that forces up to 700,000 people to flee and that also damages the infrastructure such that those refugees will be hard pressed to have the means to live seems to me to be far in excess of what needed to be done to demonstrate Israel’s deterrent and seems to go far beyond targeting Hizbullah’s support structure. Much of this retaliation has been aimed at the wrong target, namely the Lebanese civilian population, in ways that appear to have been avoidable, and it is this indiscriminate use of force, even more than the scale of the response, that has so disturbed me.
The issue is not Israel’s deterrent; once you speak of deterring an entity like Hezbullah, you grant it an unwarranted legitimacy. The issues are (1) whether Israel is justified in attempting to destroy Hezbollah, and (2) what means it may employ in doing so. I assume we all agree that Israel is justified in its aim, so the second issue becomes the crux of the matter.
Hezbollah hides behind civilians so as to make a truly proportional response impossible. That’s why I don’t support some sort of hyper-technical proportionality test. If Israel were intentionally targeting Lebanese civilians, I would rebuke such actions as unjust. But I have seen no evidence of any such thing (there was such evidence in the 1982 invasion, and consequently my position then would have been different than it is now). When we get down to the specifics, all your arguments seem to boil down to what you believe are disproportionate effects of Israel’s legitimate actions (destroyed power stations, collateral damage to innocent refugee vehicles, and the like). But in my view, the standard should be Israeli intentions, and the burden of proof should be on those who object to Israeli responses, not on Israel itself to justify those responses and prove them proportional. I don’t believe you can point to evidence that Israel is deliberately targeting civilians or that it is acting recklessly and indiscriminately. Every action I have seen strikes me as a good-faith attempt to weaken Hezbollah. Because of the nature of the enemy and the utter worthlessness of the Lebanese state, innocent deaths result from such actions. But I do not believe those deaths could be significantly reduced without significantly reducing Israel’s odds of destroying or significantly weakening Hezbollah, which is the legitimate aim of Israel.
But the entire question of disproportionate force rests on the effects of a belligerent’s actions, not whether the belligerent intended, in his heart of hearts, to do something else. Targeting refugees fleeing the war zone is the targeting of civilians. It serves no goal of eliminating Hizbullah; neither does bombing Christian villages, for that matter. These people are not the victims of “collateral damage,” as if they just happened to be driving by when the road was bombed–their vehicles were the targets of the bombings. The IDF has declared that vehicles traveling along the roads without their approval are legitimate targets–and this comes after they have told people to evacuate southern Lebanon. After displacing these people with the bombing campaign, they are then hitting the civilian vehicles as they seek refuge. That strikes me as hard to defend.
The targeting of power stations and the airport, among other parts of infrastructure, begs the question of whether targeting these things has anything to do with the legitimate aim of eliminating Hizbullah. The targeting of Lebanese army barracks suggests that the IDF is taking aim at the Lebanese state itself.
But whether or not it is a “legitimate aim” to eliminate Hizbullah, no one believes that it is practicable by air strikes alone. It will require escalation to a full-scale invasion to achieve this, and frankly very few people outside of this country will believe for a moment that such an invasion is justified by Hizbullah’s snatching of two soldiers. This campaign, in a more targeted form, might have had legitimacy, but in any event it is damaging Israel’s long-term interests and relations with most of the rest of the world. Even if I accepted the whole argument justifying everything Israel has done, and obviously I don’t, I do not accept that it is wise or in the best interests of Israel to precipitate the full collapse of Lebanon.
It is not for Israel to determine whether the Lebanese state is “utterly worthless,” and the readiness with which people are willing to accept that the Lebanese state has no legitimate grievances in this episode is part of the reason why this campaign seems unobjectionable to some. There are still obligations towards sovereign states that every state must fulfill, and this even includes a state as weak and fissiparous as Lebanon. It is becoming a commonplace opinion that Lebanon has somehow voided all of its sovereign rights because it cannot control Hizbullah, but as a matter of international law this is rubbish.
Your arguments of proportionality are overlooking a fundamental issue. A proportional response isn’t based on what has been done to you, it’s based on what is intended to be done to you.
For instance, if country B discovers that country A has decided to invade it and wipe it out, country B doesn’t have to wait until it has in fact been wiped out before it can forcefully respond to country A.
In Israel’s case, it is a tiny country surrounded by people who hate it, and openly profess their desire to wipe it out, and openly attempt to gain the means to do so. In a nuclear / post 9-11 world, it is ridiculous to sit half a world away and claim that Israel has to sit on its hands doing pointless pit for pat responses while the capability to wipe it out is being steadily built up.
Hezbollah is certainly an important part of that capability. It is the front line in the effort to completely annihiliate Israel. Therefore, arguments about which car on which road in which village Israel should or should not have bombed are pretty pointless, and illustrative of the sickness of a Western society that spends so much time berating itself that it can’t deal effectively and swiftly with third world barbarians that are trying to wipe it out.
Why are we all so sure that when Israelis hit civilians they are targeting civilians. All of the laser guidance systems we see on CNN are misleading; most weapon systems, in particular artillery, are not completely precise, particularly when there is a lack of forward observers. Plus, in the case of terrorists, civilians and combatants are hard to distinguish. Finally, we all should know, mistakes happen.
The airport thing and the bridges might be excessive, but it was designed I understand to make it difficult for outsiders to supply Hezbollah and difficult and costly for Hezbollah to transport these kidnapped soldiers to Iranian or Syrian control, in the case of the former by flight.
So, as I said above, I can’t say definitively they’re overdoing it, and certainly can’t say they’re overdoing it intentionally. Why are you so certain of this Daniel?
Take a look at this piece on the Hezbollah/Iranian connection and some of its potential implications:
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24709,filter.all/pub_detail.asp
For a variety of reasons, I don’t know why I should believe these uncited assertions by David Frum, “We know that the missile that wrecked an IDF warship and killed four sailors on July 15 was manufactured in Iran to a Chinese design. We know that Hezbollah’s longer-range weapons are commanded by Iranian Revolutionary Guards. We know that Hezbollah’s fighting forces were equipped and trained by Iranian officers. And we know above all that Hezbollah is financed, equipped, and trained by the Iranian secret service. It carries out terror missions on behalf of Iran. For all practical purposes, Hezbollah is an arm of the Iranian state.”
If true, this is important, especially the direct role of Iranian Guards in Lebanon, but I’d like to see some sources. I’m not trying to be one of these complete skeptics who says we can’t “know” what really happened here or there or in the past, but a mere assertion by a known hawkish neconservative columnist is not evidence, nor should it be. I simply don’t know the facts or the sources of the facts or the uncertainty that should attach to those sources.
Larison: “It is becoming a commonplace opinion that Lebanon has somehow voided all of its sovereign rights because it cannot control Hizbullah, but as a matter of international law this is rubbish.”
I’m not so sure about that. First, I don’t think anyone is arguing that Lebanon has lost its rights to sovereignty. To the contrary, Israel is going out of its way to rigorously define the difference between the sovereign Lebanese government and the Party of God, and expressly directing its attacks on the latter. Second, the government of Lebanon has deliberately chosen not to limit the actions of a paramilitary force on its soil whose sole function is to attack a foreign country. Seeing as how Lebanon is intentionally allowing the use of its soil to support incursions into another country, I don’t see how that is any different from simply funding such operations outright. I highly doubt that Lebanon’s little loophole flies very far in international law. Nor do I think that arguments about “proportionality” fare any better.
And can I just say that this is quite the refreshing discussion on what is usually an explosive topic? Great contributions and thoughts on all sides.
I think that last point is definitely true and probably has a lot to do with the fact that no one is accusing anyone of anti-semitism and also everyone here is, more or less, a foreign policy realist of some stripe or another, chiefly concerned with making sure the US is safe and not overly endangered by any course of action.
“So, as I said above, I can’t say definitively they’re overdoing it, and certainly can’t say they’re overdoing it intentionally. Why are you so certain of this Daniel?”
I should make a clarification. When the Israelis have been hitting refugee vehicles fleeing southern Lebanon, I expect they are hitting everything that moves on the assumption that these vehicles might be carrying rocket launchers, etc. However, I regard it as profoundly irresponsible to tell a civilian population to evacuate a zone and then start bombing the evacuation routes in short order. They are not exactly targeting civilian vehicles qua civilian vehicles, but they are bombing the corridors the refugees are using after they told the refugees to leave. That is certainly a failure to safeguard the lives of civilians and makes those attacks indiscriminate. I do not know that they are deliberately intending to kill civilians, and I would very much like to think they are not, but they have set things up in such a way as to make it far more likely that their attacks will kill civilian refugees. In my view, that is very different from civilians getting hit by chance or becoming “collateral damage.”
I do object on principle to the targeting of Christian villages, especially when all reports seem to indicate that Hizbullah genuinely has had no presence in these villages. For an interesting Catholic perspective (and one that I will grant is definitely pro-Lebanon), look at the blog of Russell Kirk’s daughter, Andrea Kirk Assaf:
http://andreakirkassaf.blogspot.com/