John Derbyshire points out something that I didn’t notice as I waded through the other stupidities of Bush’s recent speech:
The central and most glaring contradiction is the implied threat to walk away… Yoked to the ringing declaration that, of course, we can’t walk away. We seem to be saying to the Maliki govt.: “Hey, you guys better step up to your responsibilites, or else we’re outa here.” This, a few sentences after saying that we can’t leave the place without a victory. So-o-o-o:
ââ¬â-We can’t leave Iraq without a victory.
ââ¬â-Unless Maliki & Co. get their act together, we can’t achieve victory.
ââ¬â-If Maliki & Co. don’t get their act together, we’ll leave.
It’s been a while since I studied classical logic, but it seems to me that this syllogism leaks like a sieve.
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One reader has already pointed out to Derb that a syllogism is not the appropriate analysis:
http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NWQxNzMyMmU4YTRhMmQxZTcyOWYwZWQwNWI2NDAxOTM=
The problem with that reader’s analysis is that it assumes Maliki needs us to have victory over the Sunni insurgents. He doesn’t. The Iraqi government/Shia mafia can now get it done. They have the people, equipment, and organization. They simply will commit what amounts to ethnic cleansing as soon as we get out of the way. They’ll do it alone or with Iranian help. The limited assistance from Jordan and Saudi Arabia won’t amount to much to stop them in Anbar. So the only thing we’re doing now is keeping the two sides from really amping it up until one of them defeats the other.
I don’t think he’s assuming victory over “Sunni” insurgents, but over insurgency and militias in general. The Maliki calculation has to be, “How likely am I to be allowed to remain a figurehead if Sadr’s forces continue to grow in strength?” v. “How likely am I to be allowed to be a respected, living politician if I let the Americans step in to quell the sectarian violence?” (This assumes, of course, that we can do a serviceable job of squelching this violence, which is certainly a much harder job now than it would have been two or three years ago.)
One explanation amy go thus: if Iraq goes solidly into Iran’s corner, we cannot win. hence we need to strenghten Baghdad;s ability to resist Tehran, by propping up their theological rivals in Najjaf against Tehran’s favorite, and relative newcomer into the Twelver theological big time, Quom.