Francis Fukyama–who is too quickly dismissed by traditionalist conservatives–has a good piece on how out of touch with reality the neoconservatives are in the wake of the failing Iraq mission:
The failure to absorb Iraq’s lessons has been evident in the neoconservative discussion of how to deal with Iran’s growing regional power, and its nuclear programme. Iran today constitutes a huge challenge for the US, as well as for America’s friends in the Middle East. Unlike al-Qaida, Iran is a state, deeply rooted historically (unlike Iraq) and flush with resources as a result of energy price rises. It is ruled by a radical Islamist regime that – particularly since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in June 2005 – has turned in a disturbingly intolerant and aggressive direction. . . . The US is hardly in a position to invade and occupy yet another country, especially one three times larger than Iraq. An attack would have to be conducted from the air, and it would not result in regime change, which is the only long-term means of stopping the WMD programme. It is hard to have much confidence that US intelligence on Iranian facilities is any better than it was in the case of Iraq. An air campaign is much more likely to build support for the regime than to topple it, and will stimulate terrorism and attacks on American facilities and friends around the globe. The US would be even more isolated in such a war than during the Iraqi campaign, with only Israel as a certain ally.
None of these considerations, nor the debacle in Iraq, has prevented certain neoconservatives from advocating military action against Iran. Some insist that Iran poses an even greater threat than Iraq, avoiding the fact that their zealous advocacy of the Iraq invasion is what has destroyed America’s credibility and undercut its ability to take strong measures against Iran.
I would respond in partial disagreement, though, along the lines I did in this earlier post:
Yet the argument for preemption retains a certain power, in spite of events in Iraq. Recall that the Iraq War changed the status quo ante, where the CIA and American leadership underestimated al Qaeda’s abilities and ambitions until it was too late. This failure combined with the late admission by Pyongyang that North Korea had developed a nuclear weapons capability after taking advantage of a deal negotiated by Clinton and former President Carter. Most important, the 9/11 attacks radically shifted Americans’ tolerance for risk. Two salient facts stand at either end of the spectrum: the shift in perceived risk among Americans occasioned by 9/11 and, on the other side, our collective chastening following the difficulties of the Iraq War.
In dealing with Iran, it would simply be one more overcorrecdtion to take military action, including a land invasion, off the table because of difficulties in Iraq. If we look at the Iraq War, it’s clear that the initial invasion, the exploitation of WMD sites, and simple regime change were skillfully accomplished by American forces in 2003 without staggering casualties, commitment, or overall cost. The chief reason the Iraq War drones on is that the post-war strategic goal is remarkably ambitious, the outgrowth of a philosophy of democratic revolution imposed by American arms. In evaluating the Iraq policy, the disappointing and inconclusive counterinsurgency operations of 2004-2006 should be disaggregated from the conventional operations’ successes. Even if America left Iraq in 2003 in a chaotic and backwards and disorderly state, decapitating the regime of Saddam Hussein would have prevented Iraq from imposing a significant threat to the US. In short, conventional attacks aimed at weakening and disarming the Iranian regime should not be ruled out if they prove necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability. The arguments for preemption remain as valid in this case as they were in the case of Iraq, even if the major factdual premise of that war proved to be incorrect. Quite simply, just because Iraq did not have WMDs does not mean that Iran will not in the near future.
There is a place for negotiations considering the “realist” concern Iran has from the threat posed by its numerous nuclear-armed neighbors, e.g., Russia, Pakistan, Israel. Getting Iran to agree to enforceable nuclear arms limitations may require in exchange a multilateral security guarantee in case Iran is attacked by other nations, including Israel. At this point, though, I’m pessemisitc about any combination of carrots and sticks short of regime (or at least leadership) change in Iran. So long as Ira’s leadership is not merely self-interested, but concerned with an aggressive ideological program–empowering the Islamic World through isolation, cultivating a terrorist apparatus, and developing a nuclear capability–then the need to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons will remain. Our intelligence capabilities must be geared around ensuring that neither the failure to detect the 9/11 conspiracy nor the Iraq WMD errors are repeated. That all said, it would be unwise in the extreme to allow intelligence failures and the setbacks of the neoconservative segment of the Iraq War to dissuade conservatives from their abiding view that the world is a dangerous place that sometimes requires the use of force against dangerous and extremist regimes.
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