“These two guiding concepts for international relations–national sovereignty and the right to self-determination–are locked in a zero-sum battle in Georgia. Sometimes, the West takes the side of national sovereignty, as it is in the current war; other times, it sides with self-determination and redrawing of national borders, such as with Kosovo.”
–Mark Ames

Regarding this issue; the US, UK and the EU
lost any credibility they had on the world
stage with the recognition of an independent
Kosovo. Not to mention the invasion of Iraq
(the US and the UK).

{Afghanistan is another matter UBL was
living in Afghanistan and the “government” was (and maybe still is…)non-existent.
The “country” is the graveyard of Empires”}

Russia is building a causway to the Crimea (“for erosion control”) Georgia is a practice run.

Obviously the Russians aren’t going to
“give back” S. Ossetia and Abkhazia. We would be wise to encourage Georgia to forget about NATO membership and encourage EU membership.

Perhaps we should encourage many Georgian students to come to the USA on scholarships.
The uber-nationalistic (ethnic) agenda of Georgia’s president is an ugly sight to see.

Having read your posts and politics for some time, including at Chi/Law, I’d recommend that you visit this site, below. Worth a glance, anyway.

http://www.belgraviadispatch.com/

-resh

Does anyone understand why we are so inconsistent on this point?

And while the principle of the integrity of borders may be old, the idea that there is something inherently objectionable with changing them by force is very 20th Century, as evidenced not least by WWII and the Gulf War.

The overlay of popular nationalism is the important factor at work then and today that makes sovereign states’ claims more resonant and less amenable to compromise than in, say, the 18th Century. Today it’s not just the king who is concerned with losing territory but the whole people guided by their own nationalism and fear of being ruled by strange and hostile peoples.

Second, this contradiction between national self-determination and state sovereignty, and consequently the possibility of appealing to one or the other depending on your interests, has been noted as far back as (I’m estimating here) about five minutes after the principle of self-determination was formulated.

Third, Ames’s “concentric David and Goliath narratives” are nothing special either. It’s just a relatively powerful irredentist state supporting “self-determination” in a weaker state.