Not much to say. It seemed like he was channeling George Bush’s invocation of 9/11 coupled with a few bones to his buddies in POKEESTAN. I especially laughed at his “direct address” to the “Afghan people.” I’m sure they’ll get the executive summary by smoke signal within a fortnight. Otherwise, it was just more of the same: nation-building, a surge. Not much “Rah Rah” inspiring talk about turning these bastard al Qaeda into a pink mist. Winston Churchill, he is not.
His speeches are making me weary. They don’t inspire. They lack any appeal to the emotions. The only proto-emotions he displays are vague self-worshiping references to “hope” and a very abstract celebration of America’s late 20th Century “global cop” role. He has trouble connecting with ordinary Americans and their concerns. We don’t care about torture or GITMO or that the UN approved the attack on Afghanistan. Only the hardcore anti-American Left cares about such things. We don’t think our moral right to self-defense hinges on how we treat KSM and company. We believe in our right not to be mass murdered, that’s enough. We hate these people and want a leader who hates them too. They killed our people; we want their people killed in turn.
I thought his alibi about the delay on the troop augmentation was weak, and his talk of limiting the commitment of troops because of the national debt was utterly tone-deaf. If this is an essential war to prevent mass terrorism, it’s worth nearly any expense, correct? If McChrystal says time is running out, six months of delay is kind of serious right? And, along these lines, there was a bit too much emphasis on the end-date for the U.S. commitment. But what if things aren’t better in two years? What if it costs a lot but it’s an absolutely vital expense?
This speech is not a game changer. The troop surge won’t be either. And for a guy running $1T stimulus packages, his grave concern over $30B a month–pocket change in comparison–is quaint. Insulting, really.
I still think this is the wrong strategy (as I wrote last June), even if the people we’re engaging deserve to be whacked. Why? Because we won’t be able to do much to reform Afghanistan’s military. The Afghan security forces don’t operate in a vacuum. They serve a state to which many people are lukewarm. The Afghanistan’s government and traditions are the problem, and over those we have had and will continue to have little influence. Second, Pakistan is still highly divided internally over who the bad guys are, and the gravy train for their government depends upon dragging this out. Pretending they’re this great “partner” glosses over more than a little. Finally, the end state we’ve achieved in Iraq is nothing to write home about. Saddam’s gone. Good thing. But that was true five years ago. They still have a guerrilla insurgency and daily terrorist attacks and a not-terribly-pro-US foreign policy. Plus various anti-American terrorist organizations still roam its streets. If this is the success we’ve achieved some two years after Bush’s surge, we’d be in little worse shape if we had quickly left then.
Our comparative advantage is to engage enemy nation-states when they harbor terrorists overseas and to be more careful about whom we let in domestically. These tasks we can accomplish effectively with far less cost, far less loss of American life, and far more success than we’ll have in the quixotic Afghan nation-building campaign among a gaggle of violent subsistence farmers.
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I read an article by a Special Forces captain awhile ago which seemed sensible (he has actually spent considerable time on the ground in Afghanistan). He thought pouring money into a national police force and army there was foolish. The Afghans are a tribal people and their primary loyalties are tribal. Many of the Pashtun tribes are anti-Taliban and the Taliban have been mudering tribal chiefs who oppose them. He proposes arming and supplying the anti-Taliban Pashtuns and letting them defend themselves. All I’ve read about the Afghan army and police has been negative. Furthermore, trying to place non-Pashtun police and soldiers in Pashtun areas is a bad idea even if they were any good.
All the data I have read coming out of the region and from those with on the ground experience points to the exact opposite strategy of propping up a national army and police.
All of it suggest as Mr. van Oosbree’s Captain puts it…it’s the tribes stupid. The tribes don’t care about the national government. Even on a good day they don’t want what’s be peddled by “democracy” and central governments. Both concepts are antagonistic to their traditions and lives…tribal rule and tribal determination.
The only solution in Afghanistan is one that puts the tribes first. And even then it’s not a long term solution as we do not have the resources or will to babysit each and every tribal region indefinitely. And that is what is required.
Sadly, in my less than professional opinion we should abandon the nation building adventure and move into a tribal centric approach.
I’d go one step further and attach Special Forces team with each line company, placing the company nominally under the command of the Special Forces team leader and plant them with a tribe. Their job? Facilitate what ever the tribe needs. Defend them. Teach them to defend themselves. And then get out of their way.
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