Men and women are different.  These differences are inborn, exist on a continuum, but there are some pretty hard stops, not least with our sexual organs.

Trangenders have been fighting to get the same positive treatment gays have obtained, namely, the right to do was they will and to be accommodated in their beliefs by the broader society.  But something is peculiar.  What does it mean to be transgendered, if all the trappings of femaleness–femininity, attraction to men, psychological and physical characteristics–are all debatable.  Meaning, what does it mean to “feel” female, in a world where femaleness has no intrinsic content.  In other words, transgenders purport to feel the opposite of their sexual identity, but what does this feeling mean outside of a reference to universal and preexisting notion of what it means to be a man or woman. This too is under attack by the same sexual revolutionary thinking that brought us the transgender and gay rights movements.  The “define yourself as you will” concept has no intrinsic meaning; one could be a transexual and a lesbian, at the same time.  Or a heterosexual transsexual.  And a million other permutations.

There are other characteristics that also appear immutable–racial background, age, physical appearance, nationality, and intellectual endowment–that seems also in the crosshairs. And an education system founded on the aggressive assertion of one’s individual will that is indifferent to some notion of “objective reality” has few weapons to resist. At its heart, the whole concept behind transgenderism is a denial of basic reality, which will swallow transgenderism whole eventually, because transgenderism depends on the same philosophical error–nominalism–that does not allow one to say what male and female is, and thus what anyone means if he says, “I am transgendered.”

Normal people, until recently, understood good sense and psychological health both as an adaptation of one’s beliefs to the objective reality of what is around him, which they took as a given.  You called a horse a horse, and a tree a tree, and you understand, as you matured, finer gradations, such as that zebras are like horses in some ways and different in others.  Whether digital, mechanical, or otherwise, you knew all watches had something in common, and that the class of watches included both, both excluded Big Ben for example.

So what of transgender?  It reduces one’s male or femaleness to a preference, an opinion. But an opinion about what exactly, since it presupposed male and femaleness as objective categories in some sense, but not in others.  Namely they mean something, but the transgender advocates says you can adopt them at will and take some parts and discard others.  But why not take this approach to other socially relevant characteristics, hitherto assumed to be imparted by an objective reality which one aimed to understand and conform oneself to.

Why could one not say, for example, that a grown man is not a child? Or that a child is not a grown man? Much of our law is built on the adult and child distinction, for example.  Like gender, it also has aspects of a continuum, but is highly relevant for distinctions of legal consent for both contracts and sexual relations, as well as other concerns, rights, and obligations.

Proponents of the rights of transgenders would say those cases are obviously different. And, while they are different, they are not obviously so, and may not be for much longer. Because in both cases opponents of the new trend can only point in protest to an objective reality and social necessity as important checks on the right of an individual to “define himself.”  That is, nature defines in some measure childhood, race, nation, family origin, and much else.  Indeed, gender seems the easier case.  It’s variable where childhood begins and ends in different cultures and historical epochs, but men and women are quite different, and it’s rather obviously so; a man in a dress is not a woman, not matter how much he wishes it so.  His genetic code says otherwise for starters, as does his anatomy, which can only superficially resemble the female if it is mutilated.

At the heart of the transgender movement is a fundamental philosophical error pointed out by Richard Weaver, namely, the nominalism first espoused by William of Ockham.  Ockham, well known for his razor, basically denied the possibility of universals, which he considered philosophically unnecessary.  The problem with this viewpoint is that it in a sense denies the possibility of either reality or knowledge; without some ability to abstract and categorize and recognize the way things are the same or different in reference to some universals–male and female, self and other, father and child, reality and opinion about reality–every datum is just one damn thing after another, an incoherent mess, a plaything for the will and preference of the observer.

Liberalism with its ipse dixit notions of rights and its purported universal rights is on a shaky foundation philosophically.  In addition to its troubles with men and women, it cannot reliably say what is man (as in human), and how he is distinct from animals.  And it cannot say why rights are not mere preferences and persuasive ways of saying, “I want something,” because its non-universal notions of mankind do not include an appraisal of an immutable nature, which transgenderism denies in one of its important particulars. Some liberals of the Enlightenment traditions will posit man has reason and freedom, but these too are contingent notions, and are under attack by animal rights  activists and certain voices in the realm of psychology, who argue that free will itself is an illusion.

Far from being a sign of enlightenment and progress, the transgenderism view is just one more waypoint in the devolution of a healthy society.  That devolution is precipitated by liberalism and philosophical nominalism.  Both disavow man’s place in the universe in reference to a Transcendent God, whose existence colors our view of man’s nature, obligations, and range of choice.

The transgender movement is part of a broader unraveling of reality under the relentless logic of liberalism’s nondiscrimination principle, a principle that says distinctions itself are a  type of wrong and violence, and everything must instead be a product of the liberated “free will” of individuals to “define themselves.  But just as your right to swing your arm ends at your neighbor’s nose, your right to define yourself should end at objective reality.  If not, why could I not define you as an insect or rat and exterminate you if you become inconvenient.  Or, for that matter, and more likely in the near future, define child rape of the type promoted by NAMBLA as a fully consensual and beautiful expression of desires, which should be unmoored by any objective reality or limits.  It’s coming, and, having rolled over on the transgender atrocity–extended now to young kids, whose desires, as interpreted by their parents are paramount–such a society would be able to do little more than shrug.  After all, who is to say?  

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Trump’s foreign policy speech this week was a tour de force, which included uncommon common sense.  It is also a sign that he’s listening to and understands the nature of his nationalist conservative supporters, which in this instance is also popular, good policy, and a formula for peace.

One thing in particular stood out.  His olive branch to Russia, a policy I’ve long advocated. This makes sense in more ways than one.  The US has tried to maintain a unipolar world, but it has been a fair weather friend to those it has supported.  We’re not really going to go to bat for Syrian rebels if they get crushed, and they’re being crushed by the Assad regime, but also doing little for us in the fight against ISIS (which is made up partly of rebels we used to support, fund, train, etc.).

In addition to supporting its traditional ally, Russia has been sending a message to the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia that unipolarity is not the way of the future and that the US lacks the will and resources to go head to head with Russia (or China).This is all true incidentally. Such a war would be too costly and the returns on such an investment are too poor.  We simply cannot afford to maintain a unipolar world, which was always a utopian enterprise, and we must adjust to this fact.It is a needlessly provocative enterprise that gets us involved on the side of Iran, more or less, in Iraq and Syria, while opposing them in Yemen.  It means we’re selling naval vessels to communist Vietnam.  It means we’re provoking separatist movements in Serbia and opposing them in Georgia.  In other words, it is a formula for perpetual and expensive war, meddling, and the creation of enemies, and it has dubious benefits to the US and the people we’re supposedly helping.

We should respect other powerful, nuclear-armed countries and not needlessly provoke them.  We should have a foreign policy of restraint and limited objectives, whether in the Middle East or elsewhere.  We should oppose ISIS sincerely, and not merely as part of this complicated Iran-Saudi proxy war for power in the Middle East. We should ally with Russia and China against Islamic militants and not cynically empower them as we have in Syria and Libya and Egypt.

We sometimes behave as if Russia lacks nuclear weapons and offensive capability. This was de facto true in the 1990s, but their intervention in Syria is a reminder they too have aircraft carriers, cruise missiles, stand off and expeditionary capability, old friends, and a perception of the right and wrong of foreign policy.  Most Americans have likely forgotten of our support for Kosovo separatism, Ukrainian coups, Georgia’s offensive against Russia-supporting Ossetia, and the ways we have offended Russia’s traditional friends and gotten in their face in their traditional area of concern and influence.

For the sake of peace, US power, and common sense, we need to stop the reflexive anti-Russia instinct in foreign policy, because it is a dead end, it won’t end well for us, and it does not serve our people’s interests.  Thank God someone running for President finally recognizes that.



And I don’t mean that in a bad way.

Nixon represented self-consciously the “silent majority.”  He was from a modest background, was a self-made man, much more so than Trump, and carried with him resentments against “blue bloods” all his life, owing to his experiences of exclusion from various social organizations in college. He ran for student government at that time when he realized there were a whole bunch of people who felt just like him.

As crime ticked upwards in the latter part of Vietnam War and race riots and hippy disorder of various kinds reared its head, Nixon ran on a Law and Order platform, made up of Greatest Generation types and older who were fed up with all these social changes that displaced and worried them. This included the crime wave that was associated with the civil rights movement, as well as other social changes.  He won massively against McGovern in ’72, but was hated by elites, who truly did not understand him and his appeal.

He governed from the center, angering free market types with his price controls during the inflation episodes of the early 70s and angering movement conservatives with his pragmatic approach to the Cold War.  He enlisted he help of China for realpolitik reasons against the Soviet Union and rammed through a “peace treaty” to allow a swift withdrawal from the failing Vietnam War.  He was something of a foreign policy minimalist, in contrast to the more grandiose fantasies of hardcore “movement conservative” Cold Warriors who wanted to risk nuclear war to roll back Soviet communism.

Nixon stood for a basic, somewhat authoritarian cultural conservatism, but was economically pragmatic and centrist, and made largely symbolic gestures against the growing disorder of the times.

His “Southern Strategy” has longer roots than were observed at the time.  I would argue that there was a natural alliance of Yankee Catholics and Southern (White) Democrats against old money WASPs since the 1850.  That is, both groups were not totally on board with the typical “socially liberal and economically conservative” position as represented by John Lindsey in NY (in the 60) and George (Sr.) and Jeb Bush on a national level. They’re more Andrew Jackson, Al Smith, and Jim Webb.

Nixon won in a massive landslide in 1972 against McGovern. Times and demographics were different then, of course, but his appeal was similar to Trump’s.  Trump understands ethnic politics well, including the anxieties of middle class whites, because of the very ethnic politics of New York City since the 1960s.  Trump made a ton of money in NY in the 70s and 80s, but never quite fit in the “club scene” of Park Avenue and the like, and instead acted like any outer borough guy who won the lottery probably would.  And that’s why working and middle class people don’t mind his wealth; he made it, and he doesn’t act much differently than they would in the same situation.  That NYC outer borough crowd is not so different in its basic vibe as the blue collar South or Midwest, though not so much the more stoic and restrained German center of the country, nor the less anxious and more modern Western states.

Just as whites had a great deal of anxiety over racial and other social changes in the early 70s, they do again today, exacerbated by their stagnant wages and the threats posed by immigration.  Trump channels the fears of this silent majority and, like Nixon, will likely surprise our out-of-touch elites with a stunning victory in November.


Conservatism in America has always been both distinct from the Republican Party and comprised of several different constituencies and strands of thought.  There are the libertarians, of course, whose intellectual output is not matched by an equal number of voters.  There is the Religious Right, which gained steam in the 1970s after the impact of abortion liberalization, the sexual revolution, and other disconcerting trends.  There are the Rockefeller Republicans, who are not conservative per se, but who represented a socially liberal and fiscally conservative message that sold well in the Northeast, but which was largely displaced.  And then there is the New Right of William F. Buckley, which tended to be socially conservative, economically free market oriented, and a proponent of a strong and aggressive defense posture against the Soviet Union. It began as an insurgent movement, but under Reagan became the dominant strain of conservative thinking.

The New Right movement had something of an intellectual core of sacred texts, including Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, Russell Kirk’s The Conservative Mind, Nash’s The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945, and Weaver’s Ideas Have Consequences. The ideas in these books filtered down to conservative activists through publications like National Review, Modern Age, and the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, as well as television shows like Crossfire and Buckley’s Firing Line.

This movement culminated in Reagan’s presidential win, and it had broad support from voters with different concerns:  national security oriented intellectuals impressed by his foreign and military policy, Reagan Democrats who appreciated his cultural conservatism, and the aspiring college-educated middle class, who did well under his economic policies. Many apolitical people of a conservative bent also appreciated his confidence and pride in an America that was in a dejected state during the Carter administration.

After the End of the Cold War, much of the consensus that defined the Republican Party’s mainstream conservatism began to fall apart.  The party itself staying together in large part by inertia. More important, its intellectual basis became increasingly forgotten by the young activists who now ran its flagship publications, supplemented by a new strain of thought, neoconservatism, that was little different from the muscular liberal views of FDR.

The dissensus was expressed in both Pat Buchanan’s 1992 presidential run, as well as Ross Perot’s. Buchanan stood for the basic nationalist position, which was for immigration restriction, limitations on free trade, and a less activist foreign policy. Perot had a strange syncretist populism, coupled with faith in technology-enhanced direct democracy, further supplemented by free trade skepticism. These feels were, however, a minority position among Republicans.  Most people had done reasonably well through 1992, and the rot to America’s culture, demographics, and economy, mostly appeared as storm clouds on the horizon at that point.  Reagan style conservatism had not been rejected.  57% of people voted for either Bush or Perot, who split off a portion of the Republican coalition, and Clinton won.  Clinton himself won as a moderate and abandoned the Democrat’s traditional albatross of being soft on crime and welfare, favoring both the death penalty and welfare to work laws. Because of the peculiar impact of the Perot phenomenon, most Republicans stuck to their traditional views for the most part.  These were given new life following the spectacular success of the First Gulf War, after which most Republicans were not ready to turn away from an aggressive foreign policy, although the Somalia debacle in the early years of the Clinton administration began to make this shift more palatable.

George W. Bush also deviated from conservative orthodoxy, pushing his relatively big government “compassionate conservatism,” which aimed to use government to raise up the poor by expanding access to home loans, for example, and, prior to 9/11, he expressed his common-sense opposition to nation-building abroad.  Nonetheless, most Republicans supported the Kosovo Campaign under Bill Clinton and, out of Cold War habit, continued to support a muscular foreign policy.  Russia was weak, so most of these adventures were confined to the Middle East, and this instinct gained force after 9/11.

The 9/11 attacks made foreign policy the dominant issue of the 2000s.  After they occurred, only two groups had a coherent explanation and proposed strategy: paleoconservatives, who suggested a limited punitive campaign coupled with immigration restriction, and the neoconservatives, who supported an ambitious and “idealist” campaign deliberately designed to destabilize the Middle East and usher in democratic change.  The latter won out, but the Iraq War’s results proved lacklaster at first and eventually turned into an undeniable quagmire.  Similar results transpired in Afghanistan.  The disaster of Arab Democracy appeared in full flower during Obama’s administration in the Arab Spring, where relatively stable and friendly (or at least manageable) regimes became increasingly hostile, such as Egypt and Libya. Terrorist attacks in Boston, Fort Hood, San Bernardino, and Chattanooga were reminders of the importance of immigration restrictions, particularly of Muslims, to any effective containment of the Islamic extremist threat.

The failed campaigns of McCain and Romney also suggested something out of kilter about the Republican message.  The prior emphasis on free market capitalism appeared increasingly tone death to the realities of globalization, where immigration and off-shoring rendered a great swath of the economy net losers, especially among the working class. The 2008 economic crisis rendered many once middle class people impoverished, and their own struggles were easily contrasted with the continuing big bonus culture of Wall Street, who obtained massive government assistance to keep their speculation going. Further, there are cultural factors:  the decline of marriage and the increasingly Darwinian dating scene, the harsh suffocating effects of political correctness, perennial racial tensions exacerbated by Obama’s leftist message, and the realization among Baby Boomers, who did so well in the 80s and 90s, of their fragile economic position, coupled with the change in the texture of everyday life wrought by immigration and cultural leftism.  These changes to the country have all conspired to bring about a strong feeling of dissatisfaction.  The Republican Party’s continued embrace of neoconservative foreign policy also fell on increasingly deaf ears, made wise by the unfulfilled promise of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.  Finally, the occasional pushes of the GOP’s establishment wing for immigration amnesty, first by Bush in 2005, and then later during the Obama years, added alienation to this dissatisfaction, and amnesty was for many the last straw.

The Alt Right emerged from a combination of these structural and intellectual factors.  All of the changes above made core Republican voters–middle class whites–more nationalist in tone and orientation.  At the same time, the declining intellectual integrity and influence of the Right’s flagship publications have left lacunae that have been filled from a combination of samizdat sources, ranging in quality, but all of which have been magnified in influence by the weakening power of gatekeepers.  On Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, and numerous blogs, wide-ranging “forbidden” ideas have gained currency, including the Mens’s Rights Movement, the nationalist views set forth in Richard Spencer’s Radix publication, the race realism of American Renaissance magazine, Steve Sailer, and Vdare,  foreign policy skepticism, and anti-feminism.  These heterodox ideas have been further amplified by internet-savvy, alienated, and undeniably mischievous young activists, who are also energetic and sharp, and have been behind such diverse phenomena as the “chalkening,” #gamergate, and #NROrevolt.

Ironically, the increasingly ideological and unrigorous laundry list of official “conservatism” propagated by National Review and the mainstream Republican Party, is less intellectual than ever.  The often Catholic intellectual forbears of Reagan’s New Right views are now unread and forgotten for the most part, including by the Alt Right.  Instead, we have ended up with the shrill John Podhoretz and unserious Jonah Goldberg, whose main influences appear to be pop culture, in which both are immersed. The new leadership, often Jewish, is frequently reflexively hostile to the ethno-nationalist strains of conservatism that existed even in the very recent past.  Further, the devolution of National Review–which has purged such stalwarts as John Derbyshire and Peter Brimelow for their “politically incorrect” musings on race–is engaged in purges on explicitly liberal grounds.

The early National Review did not represent nearly as dramatic a break with the Old Right of H.L. Mencken, Robert Taft, and the American Mercury magazine.  Just as the Cold War created a new phenomenon–Soviet sponsored aggressive international socialism– that supported abandoning the traditional isolationism of the Old Right, the new phenomena of globalization, mass immigration, and crony-capitalism collectively demand the revival of the national unit, as well as a privileged position for its core historical demographic (white people), as an adaptation to new circumstances.

Like the occasional New Right thinker such as Erik von Kuehnelt Leddihn, the Alt Right has a more continental and authoritarian view than the classically liberal free market views of the New Right.  But even this distinction can be overstated.  Reagan embraced the Chrysler bailout and pushed for increasing exports to Japan.  Further, Reagan continued the Nixon realpolitik rapprochement with China to weaken our number one foreign policy threat, the Soviet Union. Reagan had the good sense to withdraw from Lebanon after the Beirut Barracks Bombing. No one thought, as many Republican leaders do today, that we were honor bound to stick around the Middle East for 15 years pursuing the impossible, as we have done in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, our ties to Israel made sense when the Soviet Union went “all in” for Arab Nationalism after 1967, but have become less useful, and positively dangerous in certain cases, after the end of the Cold War.

The modern Republican Party’s “True Conservatism” is an ideologically rigid series of positions on taxes, trade, and foreign relations that proponents imagine, but do little to prove, is coextensive with the interests and flourishing of the American people. Indeed, in characters ranging from Rubio to Jeb to the annoying Kevin Williamson at National Review, we see passionate support for jobs-destroying trade policy and fomenting unnecessary conflict with Russia and Assad’s Syria.  We also see a fever pitch of opposition to Trump, who has not signed on to this ossified political ideology, but whose patriotism and right-leanings are undeniable.

The New Right that led to Reagan was an adaption of the Old Right of Robert Taft, H.L. Mencken, and Robert McCormick.  The post-war right had embraced different positions on specific issues than their forbears because circumstances had changed.  Similarly, the Alt Right, or something like it, must replace the 35 year old views of Reagan, enshrined in the Republican platform, because circumstances have changed markedly.  But the fundamental and practical concerns with our collective existence, flourishing, and safety remain the same.  Whereas in 1992 these were developing threats, today they are in full flower, and have coupled with continuing mass immigration and anti-family policies to render the natural constituency for conservative views smaller than ever.  The Old Reagan coalition is simply too small to elect Presidents and will become increasingly weakened at the local level.  It must change its policies, tone, and focus to address the new threats and concerns of today.

Donald Trump has been a symbolic  source of energy for the Alt Right because, unlike his opponents, he is running on an explicitly nationalist message. His hostility to political correctness has been bracing.  And his expressed solidarity with the middle and wage-earning class is somewhat new for a GOP that historically appealed to the now-shrinking entrepreneur class.  This preservation of the nation is the chief concern for the Alt Right; it is now a prerequisite for any viable conservative movement, because otherwise it is simply a laundry list of stale positions, created in a different time, not designed to conserve anything in particular, which collectively do not even allow for the winning elections, as demonstrated by the twin failures of McCain and Romney.

Russell Kirk straddled the Old Right and New Right, providing an intellectual biography of conservatism that stretched from Burke and John Adams to Irving Babbitt and T.S. Eliot.  He also reminded us that “politics is the art of the possible.”  A conservatism rooted in nationalism is both possible and necessary when the integrity of the nation itself is under attack by the combined forces of globalization, mass immigration, and multicultural ideology.  Just as the GOP of Reagan had to make peace with the New Deal, any surviving conservative party, Republican or otherwise, must make peace with the legitimate anxieties of “legacy Americans,” who are being squeezed by the culturally and economically hostile upper classes and the parasitical lower classes.  As demonstrated by Trump’s successes and the enthusiasm he inspires, nationalism is both good politics and good policy under these circumstances, and the Alt Right is, broadly speaking, the heart of that movement.

Trump’s had an uptick, because of Cruz’s Pyrrhic Victory in CO. If Cruz can somehow get the nomination through procedural wrangling, it alienates half the party. If Trump gets it, the party–made up of voters–gets an unusual candidate, and some ideologues stay home on election day.  But if you represent 40-50% of voters of a party, get majority of votes, and the like, and then lose it at convention because of your failure to have a plan for the party fighting tooth and nail to deprive you of nomination, going out of its way to assign delegates that are hostile to you on second and third ballots, rearranging its rules when it looks like you may win under existing rules, then you have a lot of very angry voters who will not vote, vote Democratic in protest, start a new party, and God knows what.  And the reason is quite simple:  It feeds into their somewhat justified view that there is a bipartisan establishment out there hostile to what they believe.

Some have said this is necessary for party insiders to preserve “True Conservatism.” But save in what sense.  That it carries on and loses elections? That it puts forward “True Conservatives” like McCain, Bush, and Dole?  That it presides over the replacement of the American people?  That it doesn’t raise a peep on the latest atrocities of transgender bathrooms and women in the infantry?

I don’t understand this position, nor the passion with which this party fights Trump.  I guess I do understand . . . the uneasy marriage of the middle class and the corporate class which makes up the Republican Party is breaking apart.
But I think it’s all short-sighted and stupid in the circumstances, even from the narrow concern of winning elections. I’ve always believed the party should nominate the most conservative person who can also win.  But Trump is that person, and the issues of conservative concern–our economic stagnation, the immigration question, and our not-terribly conservative activist foreign policy–are at the forefront of his campaign.
There’s a lot more of us (Trump supporters, fed up white people, whatever) than there are of people that make a fortune on consulting campaigns, who are CEOs, who want to make money of of illegal immigrants, or who shed tears for the Eric Cantors of the world.
I would also add this has not happened so much in years past because people who had no chance would eventually lose steam.  But Cruz and the other #NeverTrump types have gotten a bucket full of donor money, who are deathly afraid that Trump will lose their death grip on the GOP.  Indeed, their denouement would be the most salutary effect of a Trump victory, not matter what else happens.  Because these are the people pushing gay marriage and tranny bathrooms and idiotic wars like Libya and Syria against the good sense of the American people and the majority of self-identified Republicans.

Porter at Kakistocracy writes something interesting, which we’ve seen a prequel of in the “outing” of opponents of California’s gay marriage law (which obtained a majority, incidentally):

I predict the secret ballot will also find its footing increasingly tenuous among both liberals and their conservative valets. You see the emotional platforming for this daily on battle sites across the Internet.

You’re scum and a coward! Not even man enough to put your name and face behind your vile hateful words.

Yes, fair enough. Not every man has the spine to regurgitate bland liberal dogma under his real name. And since we should have the guts to take personal responsibility for our words, why not also our ballots? Just as with our expressions online, no harm at all will come to those making appropriate choices. I think most people will find their corporate employers quite tolerant of the electoral selections they are willing to tolerate. Just stay within the generous bounds of our values and no one should ever need to cover their name or their vote. It’s been so long ago, most can barely recall the Federalist Papers being written pseudonymously by craven refuse such as Hamilton and Madison. And we don’t want to return to those dark days.

So archive this post as prediction.

Trump lost in Wisconsin, which is a unique state and not necessarily a Republican stronghold. I don’t think this is a harbinger of some sea change in the likely outcome of the primary.  Trump will still pull this off, and nothing relevant has changed.

Like much of the Upper Midwest, Wisconsin reflects the values of the German and Scandinavian people who settled it.  This has long been a Republican leaning area, but has little of the libertarian-oriented and bellicose culture of the Scots Irish, nor the pro-capitalist feelings of the Patrician WASPs of the Northeast and every country club in America. Midwesterners are in favor of order, tranquility, efficiency, fiscal responsibility, but is not necessarily concerned about racial issues, from which it is largely insulated, nor animated by the kind of culture war resentments that inspire “ethnic” whites who have fled diversity in America’s cities.

Trump somewhat uniquely has won among a variety of constituencies:  Southerners, Evangelicals, working class whites from rural and urban areas, and New Yorkers impressed by his plain spokenness.  But the Midwest and its culture of “niceness” and high level of social peace and prosperity are not fertile ground for his message.  But the races ahead suggest a series of wins, including in NY.  Furthermore, the press is guilty of malpractice in its failure to run down Ted Cruz’s sex scandal, which should kill his fraudulent campaign, and the party leadership appears to have used him as a “cat’s paw” to dethrone Trump, with the aim ultimately of installing a moderate like Jeb, Graham, or Rubio at the convention.

This won’t work. For starters, Trump is likely to hit the majority number for delegates or get very close to it.  And, even if he didn’t, and even if somehow the party installed one of its own at the convention–which Kasich thinks would be just neato–the voters would either follow Trump to a Third Party, refuse to vote on principle, or do something else to show their contempt for the GOP.  Such a move would play into their well evidenced paranoia of a party cabal hostile to its voters, and the party will be like a locomotive pulling empty cars. Perhaps that’s inevitable.  The party’s coalition of the rich and the working class is an uneasy marriage at best, the leadership offers little to the latter part of that group, and our interests are increasingly divergent.  It seems win win.  Either Trump rebrands the party, or the party disappears and a new, nationalist party takes its place.  There just ain’t enough country club members to win elections.


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